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CASE NOTES
only then may it consider whether the discount is a violation of subsection
(c)
While the court is not clear as to the guidelines for this new method of
determining subsection (c) violations, it still takes pains to avoid the snare
of fusing the defense of subsection (a) with subsection (c).27 The court's
position is not as artificial as it may appear. It was argued in the respondent's
brief that the mere fact that the conduct in question is nonviolative of sub-
section (a) does not preclude its violation of subsection (c). 28 Something of
the converse may also be true, that if a business practice clearly falls within
the sanction of subsection (a) it must so remain and not be invalidated
because, in form though not in substance, it is described in subsection (c).2°
With the Thomasville decision, it is now necessary to determine whether the
brokerage rate was an internal matter—the seller's response to factors not
peculiar to one customer—or was a concession to favored customers."
A criticism which can legitimately be brought to bear on the case is that
despite all of its fine distinctions there seems, in effect, to be a fusion of sub-
sections (a) and (c), thereby greatly diluting the effect of subsection (c).
Whether this unfortunate tendency actually is present will depend on the use
of Thomasville in future decisions involving subsection (c) violations."'
PAUL E. D'HEDOUVILLE
Trade Regulations—Robinson-Patman Act—Meeting Competition.—
Sunshine Biscuits, Inc. v. FTC.'—Sunshine Biscuits manufactures and
distributes baked goods on a nation-wide scale, and in the Cleveland
area it sells potato chips to independent retail outlets by way of its Velvet-
Krun-Chee Division. In 1959 competing local distributors offered discount
prices to some of Sunshine's Cleveland customers and Sunshine responded
with similar discounts. The lower prices enabled Sunshine to keep its old
customers, and were also a source of new business from customers who had
not previously purchased from Sunshine. The Federal Trade Commission
issued a complaint against Sunshine showing that its discriminatory prices
had injured competition as prohibited by Section 2(a) of the Robinson-
Patman Act." At a subsequent hearing the examiner found the Commission's
27 Rowe, supra note 6.
28 Brief for Respondent, p. 24.
29 80 Cong. Rec. 9417 (1936): "There is no limit to the phases of production, sale
and distribution in which such improvements may be devised . . . nor from which those
[improvements] . . . when demonstrated may be expressed in price differentials in favor
of the particular customers whose distinctive methods of purchase . . . makes them
possible."
10 Brief for Petitioner, p. 5: "This has been the practice as far back as anyone
presently with the company can recall."
31 It is somewhat significant to note that FTC did not apply for certiorari.
1 306 F.2d 48 (7th Cir. 1962).
2 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C.	 13(a) (1958).
Section 2(a) of the act, as amended, provides in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course
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allegations to be true, but dismissed the complaint when Sunshine intro-
duced evidence that its discriminatory pricing was carried on "in good faith
to meet the equally tow prices of a competitor," and thereby justified under
the terms of section 2(b) of the act. 3
 This result was later vacated by the
Commission, a cease and desist order against Sunshine being substituted.
In a four-to-one decision the FTC ruled that discriminatory prices are always
illegal when used to obtain new customers and can be justified under section
2(b) only when granted in a good faith effort to meet competition for the
purpose of retaining old customers. On appeal the Seventh Circuit reversed.
HELD: A complete defense to a charge of price discrimination is established
when a seller shows that his price differential was made in good faith to meet
the lawful and equally low price of a competitor. It is of no consequence
that these prices are being offered to purchasers who have not been the
seller's customers in the past.
The Robinson-Patman Act enacted in 1936 amended the original Sec-
tion 2 of the Clayton Act.' by providing that price discrimination among
of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price be-
tween different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality . . . where
the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition
or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy,
or prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives
the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them. . . .
3
 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1958).
Section 2(b) of the act, as amended, provides in part:
Upon proof being made, at any hearing on a complaint under this section,
that there has been a discrimination in price . . . the burden of rebutting the
prima-fade case thus made by showing justification shall be upon the person
charged with a violation of this section, and unless the justification shall be
affirmatively shown, the Commission is authorized to issue an order terminat-
ing the discrimination: Provided, however, that nothing [herein] contained shall
prevent a seller rebutting the prima-facie case thus made by showing that his
lower price to any purchaser or purchasers was made in good faith to meet
an equally low price of a competitor...
4 The Clayton Act of 1914, 38 Stat. 730 (1914), was addressed to the trade prob-
lems of that day and was aimed at the growing number of nation-wide manufacturers.
These large trusts, while somewhat restricted by the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890),
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1958), chewed up small local competition by slashing prices in local
areas just long enough to drive any small competitors out of business. This was the
situation in Puerto Rican American Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 30 F.2d 234
(2d Cir. 1929), where the court affirmed an injunction issued against the defendant
halting his predatory lower prices in Puerto Rico which were designed to "eliminate a
weaker competitor," id. at 237.
Congress attacked these tactics by prohibiting price discrimination which was
injurious to competition or which tended to create a monopoly. The pricing could be
justified, however, by showing that the price differences reflected "differences in grade,
quality, or quantity of the commodity sold." Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730 (1914). (Em-
phasis added.) The legality of the quantity discount was established in Goodyear Tire
& Rubber Co. v. FTC, 101 F.2d 620 (6th Cir. 1939). This case, while decided after the
Robinson-Patman Act was adopted, reversed an order that was issued against Good-
year prior to 1936.
The quantity discount provision proved to be a loophole in the Clayton Act for
sellers who dealt with large chain stores. The purchasing power of the large chains
enabled them to demand substantial discounts from the suppliers, and these savings were
reflected in the prices offered to the consumer. Small buyers had no relief under the
Clayton Act. National Biscuit Co. v. FTC, 299 Fed. 733 (2d Cir.1924); Mennen Co. v.
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competing customers 5
 is illegal if such discrimination may injure or lessen
competition in any level of commerce.° The burden of proving this price
disparity and its adverse effects on competition is placed upon the party who
alleges the violation.? The law is designed to prevent a seller from charging
discriminatory prices and thereby injuring competitive sellers (primary line
injury), injuring buyers or those in competition with them (secondary line
injury) or harming those who purchase from these competing buyers (third
line injury).
Under section 2(b) of the act the prohibited price discrimination can
be justified on a theory of meeting competition. The party charged with the
violation must show certain facts in order to establish his defense.° The price
offered must be made in a good faith effort° to meet the lawful pricel° of a
competitor. Early decisions interpreted the defense as a complete justification
for pricing practices proscribed under section 2(a)." In 1945, however, the
Federal Trade Commission tried to scuttle this earlier policy when it halted
the pricing practices being carried on in the Detroit gasoline market by
Standard Oil of Indiana.' 2
 The Commission proposed that the defense was
no good when the price discrimination was shown to be injurious to com-
petition. They, in effect, would allow sellers to invoke the 2(b) defense only
FTC, 288 Fed. 744 (2d Cir. 1923). Pressure from independent merchants led to an
FTC investigation of chain stores in 1928. The Commission made its final report in
1935 and in the following year the Robinson-Patman Act was passed, eliminating the
quantity discount defense. This revision aimed to check what. seemed to be the in-
evitable domination of retailing by chain stores. FTC Final Report on the Chain Store
Investigation, S. Doc. No. 4, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 301 (1935); Austin, Price Dis-
crimination and Related Problems Under the Robinson-Patman Act 11 (2d rev. ed. 1959).
5
 The customers need not be in competition with each other when the injury com-
plained of is to the primary line, i.e., harmful to sellers who compete with the party
who is offering the discriminatory prices. FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536,
545-46 (1960).
Corn Prod. Ref. Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726, 738, 742 (1945).
7
 A. E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 135 F.2d 453, 455 (7th Cir. 1943); Attorney
General's Committee Report on the Study of the Antitrust Laws 161 (1955). But see,
Samuel H. Moss, Inc. v. FTC, 148 F.2d 378 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 734. (1945).
In this case the Second Circuit required that the complainant (FTC) show only that
there was a price discrimination and then put the burden on the respondent (Moss)
to show that injury to competition did not result.
8
 Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 250 (1951) ; FTC v. A. E. Staley Mfg.
Co., 324 U.S. 746, 758, 759-60 (1945). These cases firmly established the meeting com-
petition defense.
9
 Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 233 F.2d 649 (7th Cir. 1956), aff'd, 355 U.S. 396
(1958).
10
 ". . a seller should be deemed to have met a lawful price unless he knew or
had reason to know otherwise." Attorney General's Committee Report, supra note 7
at 182. See also cases cited in note 8 supra; see remarks of Rep. Utterback stating
that Congress intended that only lawful prices be met, 80 Cong. Rec. 9418 (1936).
11 General Shale Prod. Corp. v. Struck Constr. Co., 132 F.2d 425, 429 (6th Cir.
1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 780 (1943); See also Moss v. FTC, supra note 7.
12 Matter of Standard Oil, 41 F.T.C. 263 (1945), modified & aff'd, 173 F.2d 210
(7th Cir. 1949), rev'd, 340 U.S. 231 (1951). Standard had been selling its gasoline to
four "jobbers" at a PAO discount from the regular tank-wagon price offered to retail
dealers. Some of this gas was sold on the retail market at stations which were operated
by the jobbers. The FTC showed that the price discrimination had lessened competition
through injury to the small retail stations. Standard admitted the practices as charged,
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to justify a price discrimination not shown to be injurious to competition.
Since any discriminatory prices which are not harmful to competition do
not come within the prohibitive terms of section 2(a), such a defense would
be meaningless. The Supreme Court reversed the Commission on this point
and rejected its interpretation of 2 (b), holding that under this section "it is
a complete defense to a charge of price discrimination for a seller to show that
his price differential has been made in good faith to meet a lawful and
equally low price of a competitor."" The Court did not give a restrictive
interpretation to the Clayton Act provisions, and, as a result, aligned itself
with those who had drafted the act." The absolute right of sellers to offer
discriminatory prices in order to prevent competitors from stealing their
customers was firmly established in the Standard Oil decision.
In the present case the Federal Trade Commission did not deny the
availability of an absolute 2(b) defense, but maintained that the language
in Standard Oil restricted its use to fact situations similar to that case."
They urged that the court follow a recent Second Circuit case which held
that is well settled that a lowered price is within 2(b). . . only if it is
used defensively to hold customers rather than to gain new ones.ma The
instant case rests squarely on the issue of how far the scope of this 2(b)
defense extends, and whether or not it reaches far enough to allow the pro-
curement of a new customer with competitive, yet discriminatory, prices. The
court states the question to be "whether the language of section 2(b) was
correctly limited by the Commission to situations in which Sunshine granted
discounts equal to those of its competitors in order to retain its customers
or whether the section also permitted Sunshine to grant similar discounts to
purchasers who up to then were not its customers." 17
but offered evidence tending to prove that its lower prices were offered to the jobbers
in good faith to meet the equally low prices then being offered them by competitors. The
Commission treated this evidence as immaterial, stating that "this does not constitute
a defense in the face of affirmative proof that the effect of a discrimination was to
injure, destroy and present competition with the retail stations. . . ." 41 F.T.C. 263,
282-83 (1945). This leading case is well analyzed in McGee, Price Discrimination and
Competitive Effects: The Standard Oil of Indiana Case, 23 U. Chi. L. Rev. 398 (1956).
13 Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, supra note 8, at 246. A second decision, supra
note 9, firmly established the defense and, in particular, held that Standard had exercised
"good faith" in the pricing practices used to meet competition.
14
 Standard Oil v. FTC, supra note 8, at 249.
13 In the Standard Oil decision, supra note 8, at 241-42, the Court stated that
"the actual core of the defense • . consists of the provision that wherever a lawful
lower price threatens to deprive a seller of a customer, the seller, to retain that customer,
may in good faith meet that lower price." (Emphasis supplied.)
16 Standard Motor Prod. v. FTC, 265 F.2d 674, 677 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 826 (1959). The decision adopted the Commission's interpretation of Standard
Oil as part of its reasoning in affirming an FTC cease and desist order halting a New
York City auto parts distributor whose discount-rebate system in pricing was dis-
criminatory. The court made the quoted remarks a part of its opinion, but relied strongly
on the Staley decision, supra note 8, and found that Standard's discriminatory pricing,
carried on as part of a general pricing policy rather than individually negotiated sales,
lacked the good faith required in maintaining the defense.
17 306 F.2d at 50. Resolution of this central question depends on what is con-
sidered to be the source of the defense. Sunshine urged that the statute itself be
looked at in defining the defense since it is the act which establishes the illegality of
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Had the Commission's position been sustaiged, practical problems of
enforcement would have arisen. The shortcomings of a system which favors
discounts to old customers as opposed to new ones were outlined by Com-
missioner Elman in his strong dissent to the Commission's opinion:
The line between 'old' and 'new' customers is far easier to state
than to apply to the myriad situations that develop in actual
business relations between sellers and buyers. . .
Does an 'old' customer retain that status forever, regardless of the
infrequency or irregularity of his purchases? Suppose an 'old' cus-
tomer transfers his business to another seller offering a lower price;
how long a grace period does the first seller have in which to meet
the lower competitive price? If he waits too long will the 'old'
customer be regarded as a 'new' one, and hence unapproachable
because Section 2 (b) no longer applies? If so, how long is too long?
And if not, does it suffice that the buyer has at any time in the
past, no matter how remote, been a customer of the respondent?' 8
These practical problems, as troublesome as they might be, would be
overshadowed by the adverse economic ramifications effected by such a
policy. The Commission's present enforcement policies contravene the com-
petitive price structure aimed at in the Sherman Antitrust Act." In the
face of this traditional policy the Commission encourages a system of sub-
stantial price rigidity in each market area. Their policy would buttress
resale price maintenance and defeat competition by bolstering rigid oligopoly
pricing in a particular locale. 20 The interstate distributor who can cost justify
his price differentials or the local distributor not regulated by the act is
price discrimination to begin with. On the other hand, the Commission seemed to be
holding out Standard Oil as the source, asking that the terms of that decision be inter-
preted and followed when the defense is applied. Sunshine would see in the decision
only a judicial determination of the depth or strength of the defense, and no limitations
or restrictions of the statutory terminology with regard to scope.
The Attorney General's Report treats the question as did the court in the present
case:
Standard Oil does not confine the 'good faith' proviso solely to defensive reduc-
tions to retain an existing customer. The Supreme Court in that opinion merely
employed language describing the case at bar; it did not promulgate a general
doctrine surrounding each seller with a protected circle of customers which may
be exploited without fear of rival's price attacks. Such a limitation in any
event would not be in keeping with elementary principles of competition, and
would in fact foster tight and rigid commercial relationships by insulating
them from market forces.
Supra note 7, at 184. See also Hally, The Meeting Competition Defense in Robinson-
Patman: FTC v. The Courts, 3 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 201, 205-06 (1962); Simon,
Price Discrimination To Meet Competition, 1950 U. Ill. L.F. 575, 588 (1950).
18 Matter of Sunshine Biscuits, Inc., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. TI 15,469, at 20,317 (1961)
(dissenting opinion).
19 See, Burns, The Antitrust Laws and the Regulation of Price Competition, 4
Law & Contemp. Prob. 301 (1937). See also remarks of Mr. Justice Jackson who made
this point during the oral argument of the Standard Oil case as reproduced in Simon,
op. cit. supra note 17, at 581.
20 See, The Swinging Door—or How to Avoid One Antitrust Law by Violating
Another, 59 Yale L.J. 158, 162 (1949).
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protected by this policy 1 whatever price he is maintaining, and, as long
as regulated competitors cannot offer an equally Iow price, his customers are
tied securely around him in a permanent economic colony. The problem was
recognized by the Attorney General's Committee when they urged that
"the absolute status which the Supreme Court accorded the 'meeting com-
petition' defense must not be undermined by interpretations thwarting its
effectiveness."21
The reversal of a Federal Trade Commission ruling in this case is in
line with a present trend on the circuit court level. In a recent case the Fifth
Circuit set aside a cease and desist order made against the Sun OH Com-
pany.22
 There, as in the instant case, the Commission interpreted the 2(b)
defense in a restrictive manner; the court responded with a reversal, but
was subsequently reversed by the Supreme Court, which agreed with the
FTC.23
The holding in Sunshine is clear; its terms bring the procurement of
new customers by means of competitive discriminatory prices within the
2 (b) provisions—but how far has the door been opened? The facts of the
case cannot be overlooked as they might well determine the weight that the
case will have in future ,opinions. The court has allowed an acquisition of
new customers, yet the circumstances of the transactions are such that the
market practices could be labeled defensive acquisitions. Another court, dis-
tinguishing Sunshine, could halt other sellers if they found their dealings
to be an aggressive acquisition of new customers. So deciding, they could
move to save what was left of Robinson-Patman 2(a) and 2 (b) and yet
remain in line with the overall competitive spirit envisioned by the drafters
of the Sherman Act. The Sunshine question is still open to this extent at
least ?l
21 Supra note 7, at 181.
22 Sun Oil Co. v. FTC, 294 F.2d 465 (5th Cir. 1961), noted in 75 Harv. L. Rev.
429 (1962). The court recognized that Sun's lower price to its independent retail out-
let was really a lower price being made to the consumer to meet the gasoline prices
offered at a nearby station, which was owned and operated by another distributor.
The decision reflected the realities of the market place as it allowed the 2(b) defense
on prices offered to the independent retailers, not to meet competitive prices being
offered to them, but to meet the actual consumer level competition; the court labeled
the independent outlets as "conduits."
23
 83 Sup. Ct. —, 31 L.W. 4055 (1963). The Supreme Court reversed the decision
cif the Fifth Circuit and expressly limited the 2(b) defense to sellers who meet the
prices being offered by their own competitors, and not to sellers who reduce their prices
to a particular purchaser in order to enable that purchaser to meet the prices being
offered by the purchaser's own competition. The Court examined the record and found
no evidence that the station competing with Sun's retail outlet was more than a
retailer. The Court of Appeals had assumed that the competing station was an integrated
supplier-retailer. The opinion indicated that the case might have been treated differently
if such a structure were shown in the record. The Court stated that their opinion would
not prejudice Sun from applying to the Commission in a petition to reopen the record
for admission of any evidence on this point should it be available. Two Justices felt
that the Commission should be ordered to admit any such evidence. See note, 4 B.C.
Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. No. 3 (Spring 1963).
24 The Federal Trade Commission has decided not to appeal this case to the
Supreme Court, Trade Reg. Rep. fl 50,166 (1962). In a public statement issued on
November 23, 1962, the Commission stated that, in the judgment of the Solicitor
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As has been apparent for a long time, the Robinson-Patman Act is, as
a whole, one of our most controversial trade regulation statutes. The recent
trend in litigation is one that reflects the FTC's manifest desire to limit
the scope of the 2(b) defense as far as the courts will allow. Sunshine Bis-
cuit is a significant decision demonstrating this spirit, and on the other hand
showing that the courts are shouldering the formidable task of aligning the
Robinson-Patman Act, along with the other antitrust laws, into a system
that will protect the consumer and yet nurture the economic growth of our
nation.
JOSEPH H. SPAIN
General, appeal would not be appropriate because the court did not reach the factual
question raised on appeal in its disposition of the case. The decision makes the 2(b)
defense available to a seller whether the customer is new or old, and the court did not
decide the factual question of whether the buyers in this case were old or new cus-
tomers of Sunshine.
The Commission feels that it will not have to change its position because of
this decision. It points out that there is now a split of authority between the circuits
on this question of law and it will maintain its position with the holding in the
Standard Motor case, supra note 16, a Second Circuit decision.
Commissioner Elman, while agreeing with the outcome of the case on the Court
of Appeals level, felt that the Commission should have appealed the case for final reso-
lution of the issue. As he pointed out, future sellers face a prospect of litigation should
they engage in the same practices here approved by the Seventh Circuit.
A final settlement on this question, in the absence of an FTC policy change, is a
Supreme Court decision. Those waiting for a clear resolution of the issue can hope
that the Commission finds a litigious seller who has clearly obtained a new customer
by offering to him a price equally as low as the price being offered by a competitor.
It is a fair speculation that one will be found, but the FTC will not look for him
in the Seventh Circuit.
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